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Abstract
Introduction: SARS-CoV-2 is the etiologic agent of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), 
a highly contagious, emergent, acute, viral pneumonia that emanated sporadically in Wuhan, 
China in December 2019. COVID-19 became pandemic in February 2020 leading to 4,942,687 
confirmed cases, over 321,987 deaths and grounded several economies around the world as of 
May 2020. Although global researchers, epidemiologists, virologists, and medical professionals 
rose steadily to contain the disease, indepth knowledge and concerted efforts are still evolv-
ing on the virus. This research sought to elucidate the biological Strengths, the Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, and Threats to SARS-CoV-2, with a view to understanding and devising holistic 
strategies at combating, mitigating, and overcoming the scourge of COVID-19.
Methods: This systematic review and narrative synthesis utilized PubMed, Google, DOAJ, 
ProMed, recent literatures and other databases to search and finally select about 98 publica-
tions on Coronaviruses, 2019-nCoV, and COVID-19 disease, using text word searches to gen-
erate the specific terms following the PRISMA method. Relevant publications were reviewed 
and compared, findings were synthesized using a narrative method and presented qualitatively. 
Results: Some identified Strengths of SARS-CoV-2 include: The ability to effectively cross 
the species barrier and establish productive infection in humans; SARS-CoV-2 is a new strain of 
Coronavirus; three virulence factors (Nsp1, Nsp3c and ORF7a) interfere host’s innate immunity 
and immune escape; ORF8 and ORF10 proteins  are uniquely associated with SARS-CoV-2; 
genetic fitness of the spike protein facilitates attachment and fusion; existence of polybasic 
cleavage site in the genome; SARS-CoV-2 has a short serial interval of 4.0 days; and the ability 
to resurge and enter into regular circulation after the initial pandemic wave. The Weaknesses 
include: Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme 2 (ACE2) is the sole receptor for SARS-CoV-2; Host 
protease processing during viral entry is a significant barrier for several lineage B Coronavi-
ruses; and SARS-CoV-2 critically requires Porphyrin to inhibit human heme metabolism. The 
Opportunities harnessed by SARS-CoV-2 include: Host cellular receptors for SARS-CoV-2 
infection are expressed by several important organs in the human body;  Ease of travel, globali-
zation and aviation are potentials for global spread; Underlying illnesses, age, gender, smoking 
and immune suppression; Knowledge is yet evolving on the underlying pathogenic mechanisms 
of SARS-CoV-2; Potential silent transmission via blood and blood products;  No approved COV-
ID-19 vaccine; Confounding pattern of signs and symptoms;  and Disproportionate ‘‘Cytokine 
storm’’ or damaging evolution  of effective defenses. The Threats to SARS-CoV-2 include: 
Prohibition of mass gatherings; Prompt hospitalization, isolation and quarantining infected in-
dividuals; Repurposing proven antimalarial/antiviral/anti-inflammatory drugs;  Deployment of 
rapid laboratory equipment and procedures for prompt detection; Potential antiviral activities of 
Coagulation Factor Xa,  IIa (thrombin) and Convalescent plasma; Elucidation of the genome 
sequences; and global COVID-19 research funding.
Conclusion: SARS-CoV-2 explores its biological strengths, conserves its weaknesses, and 
exploits the host opportunities to decimate human populations. For interventions to overcome 
the virus and get out of the COVID-19 pandemic, research scientists, the academia, funders, 
industry, healthcare professionals and the citizenry should scale up all promising research by 
strategically focusing on decreasing the Strengths and Opportunities, while capitalizing on the 
Weaknesses of and Threats to the virus.
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Introduction
In December 2019, a cluster of human pneumonia of unknown etiology that emanated post infection from Wuhan 
seafood market was found in patients with respiratory distresses in Wuhan, China and was first described by Dr Li 
Wenliang, an ophthamologist who eventually contracted 2019-nCoV from his glaucoma patient and died of COVID-19 
at the Wuhan Central Hospital. [1,2] This resulted into an outbreak and the pathogen was subsequently identified to 
be Human Coronavirus that was provisionally named as “2019 novel coronavirus” (2019-nCoV) by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) on January 7, 2020. The WHO’s Emergency Committee declared the 2019-nCoV outbreak to be a 
Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 30, 2020. [3] Following the criteria of Interna-
tional Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV) on naming newly discovered viruses, the etiology of the pneumonia 
was renamed as “severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2” (SARS-CoV-2) on February 11, 2020, while the 
associated disease was named by WHO as Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). [4] COVID-19 is an acutely fatal re-
spiratory illness caused by  SARS-CoV-2, a strain of severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus, character-
ized predominantly by high fever, harsh dry cough, difficulty in breathing and fatigue. Other less commonly reported 
symptoms include, body aches, joint pains, skin tingling, loss of smell, metallic taste, diarrhea, septic shock, coma  and 
death within three weeks of infection. SARS-CoV-2 has been moderately successful in penetrating the human species 
because of its virulence and low fatality rate (2-3%) when compared to the MERS-CoV with a 35% case fatality. [5] The 
majority of initial cases of COVID-19 were epidemiologically linked to exposure to Wuhan’s Huanan seafood market, 
where wild animals are traded. [6] Subsequent phylogenetic data implicated a zoonotic origin, and the ongoing rapid 
spread suggests person-to-person transmission in human populations. As of May 19, 2020 (17:27 GMT+1), statistics 
from 213 countries and territories and 2 international conveyances indicated that there were 4,942,687 confirmed cases 
of COVID-19 around the world. Out of the currently active 2,684,199  infected patients, 2,639,039 (98%) were in mild 
conditions while 45,160 (2%) were in critical conditions. Of the 2,258,488 closed cases, 1,936,501 (86%) have recovered 
and discharged while 321,987 (14%) have died. [7] 
Nomenclature and taxonomy of SARS-CoV-2. For an outbreak of a new viral disease, there are three names to be decid-
ed: the disease (by WHO), the virus (by expert virologists) and the species (by the International Committee on Taxon-
omy of Viruses, ICTV). Based on phylogeny, taxonomy and established practice, the Coronavirus study group of  ICTV 
recognizes this virus as forming a sister clade to the prototype human and bat severe acute respiratory syndrome coro-
naviruses (SARS-CoVs) of the species Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus and designates it as SARS-
CoV-2. [8] In the realm Riboviria, the emergent SARS-CoV-2, like all other Coronaviruses, is an RNA virus belonging to 
the order Nidovirales, suborder Cornidovirineae, family Coronaviridae and subfamily Coronavirinae. [8] This subfamily 
includes four genera, namely Alphacoronavirus, Betacoronavirus, Gammacoronavirus, and Deltacoronavirus. Both the 
SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV are in the genus Betacoronavirus. [6] The genome of SARS-CoV-2 is more than 85% simi-
lar to the genome of the SARS-like virus ZC45 (bat-SL-CoVZC45), and together these viruses form a unique Orthocoro-
navirinae subfamily with another SARS-like virus ZXC21 in the subgenus Sarbecovirus  (lineage B) that shows typical 
Betacoronavirus gene structure. [8,9] Among  the original SARS-CoV Coronaviruses currently known to infect humans, 
the new SARS-CoV-2 (identified in 2020)  is the seventh strain after  HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-229E (both detected 
in 1960’s), HCoV-NL63 (identified in 2004), HCoV-HKU1(identified in 2005) and MERS-CoV (identified in 2012). 
[10,11] Based on individual specific isolate, SARS-CoV-2 may be named as for example, SARS-CoV-2/human/Wuhan/
X1/2019.
In morphology, the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) like SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, 
derived the name from the crown-like (Corona means crown in Latin) appearance that the glycoprotein spikes form on 
the surface of the virus particle. The SARS-CoV-2 is an enveloped virus with RNA genome whose virion is morphologi-
cally round or elliptic and often pleomorphic with  a diameter of  approximately 50–200 nm. The linear, positive-sense, 
single-stranded RNA genome (belonging to Class IV of the David Baltimore classification system and a property that 
may explain its fast replication) has 10 open reading frames, contains 29891 nucleotides, encoding 9860 amino ac-
ids. (Figure 1) NSP1 to NSP11 are encoded in ORF1a, and NSP12 to NSP16 are encoded in ORF1b. ORF1a and ORF1b 
generates multiple nonstructural proteins (such as 3-chymotrypsin-like protease, papain-like protease, helicase, and 
RNA-dependent RNA polymerase) upon protease cleavage. [12] The replicase proteins are involved in transcription 
and replication of viral RNAs. ORF2-10 encodes four viral structural proteins, comprising the Spike glycoprotein (S), 
Envelope (E), Membrane (M) and Nucleocapsid (N)and accessory proteins. The Nucleocapsid encapsidates the RNA 
genome while the Spike, Envelope and Membrane proteins are uniquely involved in the formation of the viral coat/ 
Envelope. (Figures 1 and 2)
SWOT is an acronym for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. A SWOT analysis table is usually rep-
resented as a grid, called a 2x2 contingency table. It  is a business or strategic planning technique used to summarise 
the key components of the strategic environments. The technique is credited to Albert Humphrey at Stanford Uni-
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versity between the 1960s and 70s, who led a research project that involved 5,000 interviews, was funded by fortune 
500 companies, and took 9 years to develop. [14] SWOT is a widely used framework for organizing and using data 
and information gained from situation analysis. The technique enables a group or individual to move from everyday 
problems or traditional strategies to a fresh perspective. It generally is a framework for identifying and analyzing the 
internal and external factors that can have an impact on the viability of a project, product, government, place, organism, 
or person. The SWOT concept is an assessment technique originally developed for business and industry with a long 
track- record of effectiveness, equally useful in other areas, and application to a variety of levels of operation. [15] The 
benefits of SWOT include; identification of areas of strengths and weaknesses, provision of comprehensive  overview 
for contingency planning, and development of  a “plan of action” to act on in a snapshot. SWOT analysis might be used 
to explore possibilities for new efforts or solutions to problems, to make decisions about the best path for an initiative, 
and is an excellent way to organize derived information from studies or surveys. SWOT is typically applied in a positive 
connotation, but could be applied from the perspective of SARS-CoV-2 and how it could be more pathogenic and more 
communicable. The multiplicity effects of COVID-19 pandemic is turning tables and fast-tracking global economies 
into recession with attendant attenuation of several human activities such as education, religious activities, tourism, fi-
nance, governance, business, socialization, employment, technology, healthcare programmes, sports, and so on. There-
fore urgent enduring interventions are required to stop the pandemic.
The objectives of this innovative review were to adapt the SWOT concept to: identifying the biological strengths of 
SARS-CoV-2, determining the weaknesses of SARS-CoV-2,  identifying the opportunities harnessed by SARS-CoV-2, 
determining the threats to SARS-CoV-2,  present gaps where scientists and researchers could key-in for productive 
Figure 1. Morphology of SARS-CoV-2. [13]
Figure 2. Genomic Organization of SARS-CoV-2. [12]
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researches, and to encourage scientists, researchers, patients, nations, industry and the academia to explore this para-
digm shift for holistic knowledge at combating this recalcitrant emerging SARS-CoV-2 of COVID-19.
Methods
Databases used in this study included: Medline, PubMed, DOAJ, BIOSIS Previews, medRxiv, JAMA network, John-
sHopkinsCSSE, WHO and CDC websites, COVID-19 Resource center, and Google search engines. Text word searches 
(including ‘‘wildcards’’ to capture term variations, e.g., SWOT analysis, COVID-19, 2019-nCoV, SARS-CoV-2, SARS, 
Pathophysiology, diagnosis, zoonotic disease, biological strengths of SARS-CoV-2, weaknesses of SARS-CoV-2, Op-
portunities harnessed by 2019-nCoV, SARS pneumonia outbreak in China, Threats to 2019-nCoV, viral Pneumonia, 
multiorgan failure due to viral pneumonia) were conducted using keywords pertaining to 2019-nCoV, COVID-19  and 
Pangolins, Coronaviruses, bushmeat trade, bat-associated zoonoses and the urban environment. Groups of key words 
were combined using Boolean operators. Medline was searched using Medical Subject Headings (natural reservoir, 
horseshoe bats, zoonoses, COVID-19, Coronaviruses, 2019-nCoVpneumonia outbreaks) in various combinations. The 
literature search was conducted  between January  and April 2020. A total of 140 articles were identified/selected for 
consideration using the PRISMA method. (Figure 3) To ensure that the review was focused on the most up to-date 
researches, all papers published prior to 1970, and in languages other than English, Chinese and French were excluded 
(n=20). Remaining papers (n=120) were organized for inclusion and reviewed according to the amount of information 
they contributed regarding the ecology, transmission, the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of SARS-
CoV-2 pathogen associated with humans. Articles with significant ecologic content were retained (n= 100) and all other 
Figure 3. Flow diagram of Literature searches and systematic review for the SWOT Analysis 
of SARS-CoV-2.
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articles were also included considering the importance of the virus and information obtained (n= 5). Finally, articles not 
focused on human Coronaviruses or SARS-CoV-2 outbreak and transmission around the world from human to human 
or from bats in urban centers were excluded (n=15). Additional sources (n=8) were added through citation searching 
and to fill specific information gaps. A total of 98 papers were reviewed in detail, data from these papers were extracted 
and synthesized based on the methodology for narrative synthesis as described. [16] The goal of narrative synthesis is to 
identify common themes across research regarding a particular subject that then can be used to identify commonalities 
and critical differences among included articles.
Results and Discussion
Strengths of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 
Strengths are the characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 that confer the pathogen advantages over the host and other dis-
eases. It comprises the positive tangible and intangible attributes, internal to SARS-CoV-2. Essentially, the biological 
strengths and attributes (Table 1) that facilitate the pathogenicity, establishment, and spread of the SARS-CoV-2 in-
clude the following: 
Ability to effectively cross the species barrier and establish productive infection in humans. 
The species barriers separating humans from nonhuman animal species, represent a major challenge for effective ex-
posure to, infection by, and subsequent spread of zoonotic pathogens among humans. [17] These species barriers can 
HELPFUL TO  ‘‘SARS-CoV-2’’ IN ACHIEVING PATHOGENIC 
OBJECTIVE (CRUSH ↓↓↓)
HARMFUL TO  ‘‘SARS-CoV-2’’ IN ACHIEVING 
PATHOGENIC OBJECTIVE (INCREASE ↑↑↑)
Internal factors 
(attributes of SARS-
COV-2)
STRENGTHS
(i) Ability to effectively cross the species barrier and 
establish productive infection in humans.
(ii) SARS-CoV-2 is a new strain of Coronavirus
(iii) Natural Reservoir of SARS-CoV-2 is unconfirmed.
(iv) Three virulence factors (Nsp1, Nsp3c and ORF7a)
(v) interferes host’s innate immunity & escape.
(vi) orf8 and orf10 proteins  are uniquely associated with 
SARS-CoV-2
(vii) SARS-CoV-2 is highly infectious at very low doses and 
has a short incubation period
(viii) Genetic fitness of the spike protein facilitates attachment 
and fusion.
(ix) Existence of polybasic cleavage site in the genome.
(x) SARS-CoV-2 elicits myocardial injury and multiorgan 
failure.
(xi) SARS-Cov-2 primarily targets the anatomical 
vulnerability of the lungs.
(xii) Permissiveness of the oral cavity for infection and ability 
of virus transmission via saliva
(xiii) SARS-CoV-2  has a short serial interval of 4 days.
(xiv) SARS-CoV-2 is very stable on most surfaces.
(xv) Ability to resurge and enter into regular circulation after 
the initial pandemic wave.
(xvi) SARS-CoV-2 evolves in vivo after infection, promoting 
virulence, infectivity, etc.
WEAKNESSES
(i) Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme 2 (ACE2) is the sole 
receptor for SARS-CoV-2.
(ii) Host protease processing during viral entry is a 
significant barrier for several lineage B viruses.
(iii) Low basic reproduction number (R0) of 3.8.
(iv) SARS-CoV-2 critically requires Porphyrin to inhibit 
human heme metabolism.
External factors
OPPORTUNITIES
(i) Host Cellular receptors for SARS-CoV-2 infection are 
expressed by several important organs in human body.
(ii) Ease of travel, globalization, and aviation as potentials 
for global spread.
(iii) Underlying illnesses, age, gender, smoking and immune 
suppression.
(iv) Rumours and misinformation about origin.
(v) Knowledge is yet evolving on the underlying pathogenic 
mechanisms of SARS-CoV-2.
(vi) Potential silent transmission via blood and blood 
products.
(vii) No approved COVID-19 vaccine.
(viii) Low sensitivity of upper respiratory specimens for 
detection of SARS-CoV-2.
(ix) Confounding pattern of signs and symptoms.
(x) Disproportionate ‘‘Cytokine storm’’ or damaging evolution 
of effective defenses.
(xi) Potential transmission via fecal-oral route.
(xii) Collection, consumption, and trade of wild game.
THREATS
(i) Prohibition of mass gatherings, prompt hospitalization, 
isolation, and quarantine of infected individual.
(ii) Prohibition of all wildlife trade to effectively prevent viral 
prevalence.
(iii) Repurposing proven Antimalarial/ Antiviral/ anti-
inflammatory drugs.
(iv) Deployment of rapid laboratory equipment and 
procedures for prompt detection (ELISA, Western Blot, 
PCR).
(v) Active contact tracing and monitoring.
(vi) Appropriate burial practices according to international 
best practices.
(vii) Sterilization or disinfection of equipment and safe 
disposal of waste.
(viii) Potential antiviral activities of Coagulation Factor Xa,  IIa 
(thrombin) and Convalescent plasma.
(ix) Availability of the genome sequences.
(x) Global COVID-19 research funding.
Table 1. Contingency Table (2 by 2) of SWOT Analysis of SARS-CoV-2.
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be divided into three largely complementary sets. First, the interspecies barrier which determines the nature and level 
of human exposure to zoonotic pathogens. Second, the intrahuman barrier which determines the ability of zoonotic 
pathogens to productively infect a human host and effectively cope with the immune response. Third, the interhuman 
barrier which determines the ability of zoonotic pathogens to efficiently transmit among humans, causing outbreaks, 
epidemics, or pandemics. Only the zoonotic pathogens that crosses the three barriers have the potential to sustainably 
establish in the human population. [18] Coronaviruses primarily cause enzootic infections in birds and mammals but, 
in the last few decades, have shown to be capable of infecting humans as well. The outbreak of severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and, more recently, Middle-East respiratory syndrome (MERS) has demonstrated the 
lethality of Coronaviruses when they cross the species barrier and infect humans. The emergent novel SARS-CoV-2 
has successfully crossed to humans from animal species causing pandemic of COVID-19. Identifying the factors that 
allow SARS-CoV-2 to cross each of these three sets of barriers is essential to mitigate burdens of COVID-19. In addition, 
intensive domestic animal breeding facilitates viral mixing and increased targets for spillover from wild viruses. [19] In 
the current epidemic, pet dogs and cats, ferrets, and tigers in zoo have been identified, so far, as animals infected with 
SARS-CoV-2 thereby increasing the host range and potential reservoirs. These findings emphasize probable human to 
animal and animal to human transmissions. Contrary to the SARS-CoV-2, one of the factors that led to the scientific 
success in the eradication of smallpox was the inability of the pox virus to cross the species barrier, thereby limiting it 
to productive infection only in a susceptible single host (i.e., humans). [20,21]
SARS-CoV-2 is a new strain of Coronavirus.
The SARS-CoV-2 is a new strain of Coronavirus not previously identified in humans. As a new virus, nobody has prior 
immunity to SARS-CoV-2 infection. This theoretically means that the entire human population is potentially suscep-
tible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. Immunological memories to infections are important in immune responses. Therefore, 
recruitment of memory T-cells are lacking in SARS-CoV-2 exposure-naive individuals. Although development of anti-
bodies (seroconversion) was found after 7 days in 50% of patients (14 days in all), it was not followed by a rapid decline 
in viral load. [22] This empowers the virus to deride the host prior to emergence of any protective antibody. Yet, de-
spite the high homology of a bat Coronavirus RaTG13 and SARS-CoV-2 in spike sequences, a recent report found that 
four among the five most important amino acids (L465, L495, Y502, D510, and H514) that bind to ACE2 in Bat-CoV 
RaTG13 differ from SARS-CoV-2. [23] Furthermore, there is no related research literature to date about whether Bat-
CoV RaTG13 can infect humans, making the SARS-COV-2 a unique virus.
Natural reservoir of SARS-CoV-2 is unconfirmed.
The natural reservoir of a pathogen is the natural host that harbors the pathogen and in which it replicates without any 
clinical manifestation of the disease. The exact origin, locations, and natural habitat (known as the ‘‘natural reservoir’’) 
of SARS-CoV-2 remain unconfirmed. Recently, it was reported that the sequence similarity between SARS-CoV-2 and 
the Coronavirus isolated from Rhinolophus affinis was 96.2%, suggesting that bats may be the source of the virus. (Fig-
ure 4) Further data indicated that the intermediate host between bats and humans was a pangolin (Manis pentadactyla, 
a scaly anteater), an endangered and commonly trafficked mammal, in which genetic recombination or reassortment of 
the bat and pangolin Coronaviruses could have occurred. [24,25] This was corroborated on February 7, 2020 as it was 
announced that nucleic acid sequences from Pangolin sample shared 99% similarity to the pandemic human SARS-
CoV-2 strain. [26]
Three virulence factors (Nsp1, Nsp3c and ORF7a) interferes host’s innate immunity and assists SARS-CoV-2 immune es-
cape
In Coronaviruses, Nsp1 interacts with host 40S ribosomal subunit that induces specifically host mRNA degradation 
and also inhibits type-I interferon production. [27] Nsp3c has the ability to bind with host’s ADP-ribose to help Coro-
navirus resist host innate immunity. [28] Research shows that bone marrow matrix antigen 2 (BST-2) can inhibit the 
release of newly assembled Coronavirus from host cells while SARS-CoV ORF7a directly binds to BST-2 and inhibits 
its activity by blocking the glycosylation of BST-2. [29] Consequently, trajectory of these evidences suggests that Nsp1, 
Nsp3c and ORF7a may be potential targets for anti-viral drug discovery.
ORF8 and ORF10 proteins are uniquely associated with SARS-CoV-2.
The ORF3b, ORF8 and ORF10 proteins have no homology proteins in SARS-CoVs. This may play a bigger role in the 
infectivity and pathogenicity of SARS-CoV-2. [30]
SARS-CoV-2 is highly infectious at very low doses and has a short incubation period.
COVID-19 spreads through close contact, by direct inhalation of droplet nuclei (containing SARS-CoV-2 virions) that 
are released when the infected coughs, speaks, yawns, sneezes or breathes (although the virus may become airborne). 
Susceptible individuals may also pick up the virus from contaminated surfaces and then inadvertently inoculate the 
mucosal membranes of the eyes, nostrils,  mouth and possibly other orifices (ear, anus, urethra) of the body. About 10-
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100  pfu of the virus is sufficient for infection and the time interval from infection with the virus to the onset of symp-
toms is between 1 – 14 days, but more often within 3-5 days. [31]
Genetic fitness of the spike protein facilitates attachment and fusion.
The critical SARS-CoV-2 Spike glycoprotein S is responsible for virus binding and entry. Whether through natural or 
genetic engineering the spike protein has been well modified to latch on to human ACE2 enzyme for attachment. Re-
search shows that the receptor binding domain of the Spike glycoprotein of Pangolin-Coronavirus was found to be vir-
tually identical to the SARS-CoV-2 strain but by one amino acid difference as a result of mutation. [32] The S precursor 
protein of SARS-CoV-2 can be proteolytically cleaved into S1 (685 aa) and S2 (588 aa) subunits. The S1 protein of 2019-
nCoV shares about 70% identity with that of human SARS-CoVs while the S2 protein is well conserved among SARS-
CoV-2 strains. [33] The highest number of variations of amino acids in the Receptor Binding Domain is located in the 
external subdomain, which is responsible for the effective direct interaction between the virus and host receptor. [34]
Existence of polybasic cleavage site in the genome. 
The incorporation of a polybasic cleavage site (RRAR) that enhances pathogenicity, makes the SARS-CoV-2 unique 
among known ‘lineage B’ betacoronaviruses. [35] SARS-CoV-2 spike glycoprotein harbors a furin cleavage site at the 
boundary between the S1/S2 subunits, which is processed during biosynthesis. The presence of a furin cleavage site sets 
SARS-CoV2-’ spike apart from SARS-CoV and SARS-related Coronaviruses that possesses a monobasic S1/S2 cleavage 
site. This site allows effective cleavage by furin and other proteases and has a role in determining viral infectivity and 
host range. [36] In addition, a leading proline inserted at this site in SARS-CoV-2 (PRRA), is predicted to result in the 
addition of O-linked glycans to S673, T678 and S686, which flank the cleavage site and are unique to SARS-CoV-2, 
thereby impacting the transmissibility and pathogenesis such as obtained in HA spike of Avian influenza viruses. [37,38] 
The function of the predicted O-linked glycans could create a ‘mucin-like domain’ that shields epitopes or key residues 
on the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 such as in HIV, thereby utilising glycan shields in immune evasion. [39]
SARS-CoV-2 elicits myocardial injury and multiorgan failure. 
Initial symptom of COVID-19 in some patients include cardiovascular presentation such as heart palpitations, tightness 
in the chest without respiratory symptoms. Increased cardiac troponin (>28 pg/mL), higher blood pressure (145 mm 
Hg) and increased creatinine kinase were often recorded as indications of heart injury. [40] Scientists have found that 
chest computer tomography (CT) scan had high sensitivity for diagnosis of COVID-19. PCR testing sensitivity may be 
Figure 4. Transmission Cycle of SARS-CoV-2. [13]
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as low as 60-70%. [40] Patients may have pneumonia and CT abnormalities but be initially PCR negative while periph-
eral focal or multifocal ground-glass opacities affecting both lungs may be observed in up to 75% of patients during 
the early course of the disease. [40,41] As ACE2, a type I membrane protein is hijacked by SARS-CoV-2, the primary 
physiological role in the maturation of angiotensin (Ang), a peptide hormone that controls vasoconstriction and blood 
pressure is attenuated. [42] Consequently, decreased expression of ACE2 is associated with cardiovascular diseases. 
SARS-CoV-2 infection and enrichment of ACE2 expression in cholangiocytes (hepatobiliary system) was proposed 
to potentially lead to direct damage of intrahepatic bile ducts and in COVID-19 patients, mild to moderate liver injury 
were often reported with elevated aminotransferases, hypoproteinemia and prothrombin time prolongation, in up to 
60% of patients. [42,43]
SARS-CoV-2 primarily targets the anatomical vulnerability of the lungs.
The original SARS virus displays less affinity for ACE2 compared to SARS-CoV-2 which has a higher tropism for the 
highly expressed human ACE2 in the mucous membrane of the alveolar epithelial cells of the lungs (Type II pneumo-
cytes). The spongy nature of the lungs and cell-to-cell fusion of the pneumocytes upon infection, leads to the pathologi-
cal cellular syncytial formation, fibrosis, symptomatic asphyxiation, hypoxemia, alveolar edema, or pulmonary conges-
tion owing to fluid accumulation and drowning feeling experienced by severe patients. [44,45]
SARS-CoV-2 has a short serial interval of 4.0 days.
Serial interval indicates how long it takes one infected person at a particular stage of the disease to infect another 
person to the point of the same stage of the disease. To epidemiologists, the serial interval is the second most import-
ant number. The serial interval suggests how rapidly the disease can spread, which in turn determines whether pub-
lic-health officials can identify and quarantine all known contacts of an infected individual. Although the (R0) of SARS-
CoV-2 is known, the median serial interval of 4.0 days appears to be short. [46] meaning that the virus has the potential 
to spread faster, as being witnessed in the current pandemic. The incubation-period distribution of SARS-CoV-2 is 
5.0 days. [31,47] This is higher than the serial-interval, meaning that the infected have started transmitting the virus at 
pre-symptomatic stage, which consequently makes contact tracing and quarantining difficult. 
Permissiveness of the oral cavity for infection and ability of virus transmission via saliva.
ACE2 receptors are present and highly enriched in epithelial cells of the tongue, suggesting potentiality of infectious 
susceptibility of the oral cavity. [48] Similarly, SARS-CoV-2 sequences were reportedly detected in saliva thereby in-
dicating replication in the salivary glands. [30] This portends the potentials of saliva as a vehicle of transmission from 
asymptomatic cases via dental care, sexual contacts, sharing feeding utensils and spitting.
SARS-CoV-2 is very stable on most surfaces compared to other respiratory viruses.
 For a respiratory virus to perpetually transmit, it is required that the virus particles remain viable and stable in air and 
on surfaces long enough after expulsion from the host to be taken up by a fresh susceptible host. The median half-life 
estimate for SARS-CoV-2 is around 13 hours on steel and around 16 hours on polypropylene. Viable virus could be 
detected in aerosols up to 3 hours post aerosolization, up to 4 hours on copper, up to 24 hours on cardboard and up to 
2-3 days on plastic and stainless steel indicating that SARS-CoV-2 shows relatively long viability on stainless steel and 
polypropylene compared to copper or cardboard. [49] These show that aerosol and fomite transmission of CoVID-19 is 
plausible, as the virus can remain viable in aerosols for multiple hours and on surfaces up to days. 
Ability to resurge and enter into regular circulation after the initial pandemic wave.
Mathematical modeling was used to predict the transmissibility dynamics of SARS-CoV-2. Using a two-strain ordi-
nary differential equation (ODE), susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR) compartmental model, and max-
Figure 5. Conjunctiva infection by SARS-CoV-2. [57]
ULJRI | https://doi.org/10.18297/jri/vol4/iss1/45 9
ULJRI The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 of COVID-19
imum likelihood parameter values, transmission of HCoV-OC43, HCoV-HKU1 and SARS-CoV-2 were simulated for 
sustained transmission. Model simulations demonstrated that: 
a. SARS-CoV-2 can proliferate at any time of year.
b. If immunity to SARS-CoV-2 is not permanent, it will likely enter into regular circulation much like pandemic influ-
enza, possibly in annual, biennial, or sporadic patterns over the next five years.
c. Short-term immunity (40 weeks, similar to HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-HKU1) favors the establishment of annual 
SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks, while longer-term immunity (two years) favors biennial outbreaks.
d. If immunity to SARS-CoV-2 is permanent, the virus could disappear for five or more years after causing a major 
outbreak. If SARS-CoV-2 induces cross immunity (70%) against HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-HKU1, the incidence of 
all betacoronaviruses could decline and even virtually disappear.
e. Low levels of cross immunity from the other betacoronaviruses against SARS-CoV-2 could make SARS-CoV-2 ap-
pear to die out, [50] only to resurge after a few years (possibly in 2025). 
Therefore, longitudinal serological studies are urgently needed to determine the duration of immunity to SARS-CoV-2. 
[50] In addition, even if the outbreak appears to die out after this first pandemic wave, SARS-CoV-2 surveillance should 
be maintained. 
SARS-CoV-2 evolves in vivo after infection, promoting virulence, infectivity, and transmissibility.
By metatranscriptome sequencing of the genomes of SARS-CoV-2 samples in the current pandemic, the intra-host 
variants per individual patients ranged from 0 to 5 with a median number of 4, suggesting a high evolution rate of the 
virus. [51] As with other RNA viruses, SARS-CoV-2 undergoes a strong immunologic pressure in humans, and may thus 
accumulate mutations that could result in changes in viral virulence, infectivity, drug resistance and transmissibility to 
outmaneuver the immune system. [52,53] The mutation rate of SARS-CoV-2 is yet unclear, but it is suggested to be at 
the same order of magnitude (0.80-2.38×10-3 nucleotide substitution per site per year) in SARS-CoV. [54] Observation 
of shared intra-host variants among different individuals implied the possibility of adaptive evolution of the virus in pa-
tients, which could potentially affect the antigenicity, virulence, and infectivity of the virus. [53] Similarly, mutations in 
the RNA-dependent-RNA-polymerase (RdRp) gene (nsp12) were reported in isolates from patients in North America, 
England and Italy. This suggests that the virus is evolving, with potential effects on antiviral drugs targeting the RdRp. 
[55] Roman et al. reported independent virus replication by consistent detection of sequence-distinct virus populations 
from the throat and lung samples of the same patient, thereby substantiating the evolution of quasi-species. [22] Thus, 
the SARS-CoV-2 genome in patients could be highly diverse, as also observed in other RNA viruses such as HIV with 
circulating recombinant forms. The high diversity could potentially increase the fitness of the viral population, making 
the elimination difficult.
Conjunctival and conjunctival discharges (or tears) are potential sources of exposure and contamination.
COVID-19 may be confusing, as it mimics conjunctivitis associated with Adenovirus infection. Recent findings indicat-
ed that SARS-CoV-2 infection might present ocular signs such as Photophobia, irritation, conjunctival infection, and 
watery discharge, (Figure 5) which are potential sources of contamination and infection in about 1-2% of COVID-19 
cases. [56] Therefore, extreme caution is recommended in ocular discharge transmission and contraction of COVID-19.
Weaknesses of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2
Weaknesses are the characteristics that places the virus at a disadvantage, relative to the host and the environment. The 
virus weaknesses detract it from its ability to attain the core goal, and influence its infectivity, replication, and estab-
lishment. Essentially, the attributes of SARS-CoV-2 that present as ‘‘Achilles’ heel’’ and targets for elimination (Table 
1) are:
Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme 2 (ACE2) is the sole receptor for Spike protein of the emergent SARS-CoV-2.
So far, three membrane exopeptidases—Dipeptidyl peptidase-4 (DPP4), ACE2, and Aminopeptidase N (APN)—have 
been identified as entry receptors for human-infecting coronaviruses. [58] Among these cellular receptors, the Angio-
tesin Conversion Enzyme 2 (ACE2) is the most potent and specific for SARS-CoV-2, [59] although research is ongoing 
about the use of basigin (CD147) as a novel route by SARS-CoV-2 to also assist in host cell entry. ACE2 entry is lineage 
B clade 1 specific. Studies have shown that protease treatment only enhanced entry of clade 1 RBDs on cells expressing 
human ACE2, but not human DPP4 or APN. [60] The requirement for this indispensable receptors renders the virus 
vulnerable to molecules or neutralising antibodies that would block acess to the ACE2 protein or that will coat the S1 
domain of the viral ligand, thereby preventing attachment. [61]
Host protease processing during viral entry is a significant barrier for several lineage B viruses.
For betacoronaviruses, a single region of the spike protein called the receptor-binding domain (RBD) mediates the in-
teraction with the host-cell receptor. After binding the receptor, a nearby host protease cleaves the spike that releases 
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the spike fusion peptide, thereby facilitating virus entry. [61,62] The RBD of lineage B betacoronaviruses is a single, 
continuous domain that contains all of the structural information necessary to interact with the host receptor. (Figure 
6) Consequently, synthetic antiviral drugs that will bind a fusion protein and prevent its elaboration, such as a protease 
inhibitor, to prevent cleavage by the protease and elicit abortive infection, such as in oseltamivir (influenza antiviral 
drug) will be of great value. 
 
Low  basic reproduction number (R0) of 3.8
The SARS-CoV 2 is a highly contagious virus (although much less than measles) and one of the currently known most 
infectious  human viruses to which there is no vaccine. However, it has a low reproduction rate compared to MERS-
CoV and Ebola virus. The current estimates of the basic  reproduction number (the  number  of  people that 1 infect-
ed  person  can  infect  during  its  infectious period, R0)  are between 1.4 and 3.77 persons. [63] This means that each in-
fection from the virus is expected to result in 1.4 to 3.8 new infections in an unexposed population, when no preventive 
measures are taken.
SARS-CoV-2 critically requires Porphyrin to inhibit human heme metabolism.
Research literature shows that SARS-CoV-2 is dependent on porphyrins, thereby suggesting that it may have originat-
ed from an ancient virus. As the virus’ ORF8 and surface glycoprotein binds to the porphyrin, the orf1ab, ORF10, and 
ORF3a proteins coordinately attacks the heme on the 1-beta chain of hemoglobin to dissociate the iron at the same 
time, to form and capture the porphyrin. The attacks reduce hemoglobin levels that carry oxygen and carbon dioxide. 
Consequently, the pneumocytes have extremely intense poisoning and inflammation due to the inability to exchange 
carbon dioxide and oxygen, leading to ground-glass-opacification of the lungs, inhibition of human heme metabolism 
and eventual disease. [64] Stemming from this requirement, to effectively relieve the symptoms of respiratory distress, 
chloroquine has been found to prevent orf1ab, ORF3a, and ORF10 in attacking the heme, thereby preventing availability 
of the porphyrin and as well inhibit the ORF8 and surface glycoproteins from binding to porphyrins. [64] In addition, 
presence of high level of glycated hemoglobin or deoxyhemoglobin (a combination of hemoglobin and blood glucose) 
in older people and Diabetics is another reason for the high infection rate in those groups of patients.
Opportunities for the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2
Opportunities are the chances to make greater gains in the environment, that is, external attractive factors that repre-
sent the reason for SARS-CoV-2 to exist, infect and spread. Opportunities arise when the virus can take benefit of con-
ditions in its environment to infect and execute strategies that enables it to become established and spread. The various 
host and environmental factors (Table 1) harnessed for infection by SARS-CoV-2 are:
Several important organs in the human body express host cellular receptors for SARS-CoV-2 infection.
SARS-CoV-2 selectively targets the ACE2 proteins that are constitutively expressed by several important organs in hu-
man body. Most importantly, different levels of ACE2 receptor expression exist in the colon, gall bladder, heart, kidney, 
epididymis, breast, ovary, lungs, prostate, esophagus, tongue, liver, pancreas, and cerebellum. These present opportu-
Figure 6. 3D atomic scale map or molecular structure of the 
SARS-CoV-2 “spike” protein (Image: © Jason McLellan/Univ. 
of Texas at Austin)
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nities for the virus to replicate in the target sites subsequent upon systemic dissemination of SARS-CoV-2 which may 
circulate through the blood and then attack ACE2 receptors in the endothelia cells of blood capillaries in the brain, 
breaching the blood-brain barrier and invading neurons. Therefore, all these organs with ACE2 expression are subject 
to infection with attendant pathological effects such as disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC), olfactory and 
gustatory perception impairments and probable long-time neurological dysfunction even after recovery. [65]
Ease of travel, globalization, and aviation as potentials for global spread
Frequent air travel or road transport are major risk factors to the global spread of infectious diseases. It is feasible to 
visit as many as three countries in a few hours and spread infectious pathogens. In contrast to airlines, public trains, 
buses, etc, are rarely fitted with high efficiency particulate air filters (HEPA). It is not only humans that travel: the 
International Air Transport Association estimates that around 80,000 caught wild animals are air freighted each year; 
many being placed in holding facilities close to populated areas whilst in transit. [66] The potential routes of trans-
mission of infectious agents on board are mainly by inhalation of droplets nuclei, direct contact with organic residues, 
indirect contact with respiratory secretions and other biological fluid-contaminated surfaces. Adventure touring or 
ecotourism, international importation by air and cruise-ship travels have been documented in the spread of diseases to 
humans. In the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, many of the cases outside of China were linked to travels. A particularly 
large outbreak occurred among the passengers and crew of the Diamond Princess cruise ship, where more than 700 
COVID-19 infections were reported during the Spring Festival transportation peak in China. [67] Index cases in many 
African countries were imported from overseas travelers prior  person-to-person transmission and community spread. 
A cluster of COVID-19 outbreaks were also detected in Hawkeys Bay, New Zealand, that was epidemiologically linked 
to a Ruby Pincess cruise ship that sailed on to Australia with more than 439 cases and 7 deaths. Once the virus is intro-
duced to a passenger or crew member on board, the ship becomes a  perfect incubator.
Underlying illnesses, age, gender, smoking, immune suppression, and blood grouping
Hypertension, diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular disease and lung cancer are proven conditions that present opportu-
nities to severe COVID-19 disease. Elderly patients with hypertension, coronary heart disease or diabetes have higher 
risk of infection (58% hypertension, 25% heart disease, 44% arrhythmia). Early estimates showed that about 80% of 
those who died were over the age of 60, and 75% of them had pre-existing health conditions such as cardiovascular 
diseases and diabetes. [68] SARS-CoV-2 infects host cells through ACE2 receptor. When the spike protein binds to 
ACE2,  it  reduces ACE2 expression, thereby inducing cellular shedding of the receptor, induction of TNF-a produc-
tion and viral entry into host cells. Reduction of ACE2 results in pathophysiology in the lungs, blood pressure, renal 
function impairment and aldosterone-dependent blood sugar dysregulation which may result in COVID-19-related 
pneumonia, acute myocardial injury, and chronic damage to the cardiovascular system. Therefore as the virus repli-
cates and decreases ACE2 levels, low ACE2 aggravates heart dysfunction, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, prostate 
and lung cancers. Therefore, the trade-off is to either increase ACE2 synthesis or allow it at the level of the pathogen. 
However, ACE2 levels can be increased by the use of RAS inhibitors as antihypertension therapy with ACE inhibitors 
or angiotensin-receptor blockers but the disease become severe in such compromised individuals. [68] Furthermore, 
the ACE2 enzyme is expressed in type II alveolar cells, and some data suggest that Asian males have a large number of 
ACE2-expressing cells in the lungs, which may partially explain the male predominance of COVID-19. However, other 
factors such as a higher prevalence of smoking among men in China may explain the difference in the sex distribution 
of the disease. Furthermore, research found that individuals with blood group A were more susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 
infection than blood group O. Therefore emphasis should be considered for protecting people with prior illnesses, old-
er age, smokers, blood group A, poor hygiene and eating habits.
Rumors and misinformation about origin of SARS-CoV-2.
Conspiracy theories on social media and sensationalist reporting, suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural 
origin are challenging efforts of outbreak response. Scientists have made concerned statements over the spread of yet 
unsupported claims that the new coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2 was created and leaked from a laboratory in Wuhan, Chi-
na. Spread of misinformation and conspiracy theories have generated panic and mistrust among the general public, 
diverted attention away from the outbreak response, and impeded the activities of health-care workers. Researchers 
from multiple countries have published and analyzed genomes of SARS-CoV-2, and they overwhelmingly concluded 
that this Coronavirus originated in wildlife. On March 17, 2020, scientists reported that the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus 
originated naturally, and is not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus. [36,69]
Knowledge is yet evolving on the underlying pathogenic mechanisms of SARS-CoV-2. 
As an emerging pathogen scientists are still in the course of understanding the underlying pathogenic mechanisms of 
SARS-CoV-2. [70] Indepth knowledge will reveal more targets for better therapy of COVID-19.
Potential silent transmission via blood and blood products. 
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SARS-CoV-2 was initially isolated in samples of bronchoalveolar lavage fluid and viral RNA has thereafter been detect-
ed in nasopharyngeal and throat swabs as well as in serum, blood, rectal swabs, saliva, urine, and stool. [71,72] SARS-
CoV-2 is a respiratory pathogen with inherent ability to disseminate via plasma or serum. This will impact negatively 
on substances of human origin (SoHo). While it seems that the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission through SoHO is very 
low, uncertainties about viraemia during the incubation period, during an asymptomatic course of infection, or after 
symptom resolution continue to be of concern in relation to the safety of SoHO. Therefore, a theoretical risk of trans-
mission of Coronaviruses through the transfusion of labile blood products is emphasized as a small percentage of blood 
samples had positive PCR test results, suggesting that infection sometimes may be systemic. [73] Therefore matters 
arising from these involve the inclusion of  screening for SARS-CoV-2 in potential blood donors or virus inactivation 
and removal in blood products or plasma derivatives before transfusion or in organ donor and transplantation.
No vaccine has yet been approved to treat human COVID-19. 
Several options can be envisaged to control or prevent emerging infections of SARS-CoV-2, including vaccines, mono-
clonal antibodies, oligonucleotide-based therapies, peptides, interferon therapies and small-molecule drugs. The mag-
nitude of the current pandemic of COVID-19 and the likelihood of future human exposures, underscores the necessity 
for pre- and post- exposure therapeutics. [74] Historically, vaccination is the best option in controlling viral diseases 
when  epidemics refuse to self-attenuate. Therefore, absence of proven vaccines constitute opportunities for the virus 
to deride the host. In developing a vaccine against the disease, inactivated or attenuated virus particle-based prepa-
ration is advisable. This can be achieved by large-scale, regulated laboratory culture of SARS-CoV-2 in a BSL-4 facil-
ity and then inactivated by either UV light, formaldehyde or β-propiolactone. Alternatively, the process to attenuate 
by several passages and carefully screen the serially propagated viruses for competent immunogenicity and reduced 
pathogenesis (induced minimal lung injury, diminished limited neutrophil influx, and increased anti-inflammatory 
cytokine expressions) compared with the wild-type virus would also prove viable. [75] However, new interventions are 
likely to require months to develop but it is hoped that as soon as other FDA approved drug (in addition to Remdesivir) 
or vaccine is found, the rage of the virus would be curtailed.
Confounding pattern of signs and symptoms with common diseases complicate diagnosis
Variability of clinical presentations complicate early detection and management of COVID-19 as it mimicks the pre-
sentation of other common respiratory diseases. Early signs of SARS-CoV-2 infection are nonspecific and mimicks 
other acute respiratory illnesses such as RSV, SARS-CoV, Influenza, MERS-CoV and even typhoid fever. In patients 
with COVID-19, blood tests typically show leukopenia and lymphopenia and most chest computed tomography scans 
show ground-glass opacities and consolidation with bilateral lung involvement. These characteristics are also shared 
by influenza A and other respiratory viruses. [68,76] Mild and pre-symptomatic cases might easily remain undetected, 
especially during the influenza season when respiratory symptoms are common. [77] COVID-19 is characterized by 
sudden onset of fever (>390C), chills, fatigue, exhaustion, sore throat,  headache, and  joint/muscle aches. Late signs are 
asphyxiation, pneumonia, kidney failure, septic shock, and death. [8] The major difference between SARS-CoV-2 and 
her predecessors is that this virus symptomatically elicits dry cough and rarely produces rhinorrhea in those infected, 
which are common in MERS and SARS cases. Co-infection of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza A virus has been reported, 
thereby demonstrating additional challenges to detection, especially when patients test negative for SARS-CoV-2 but 
positive for another virus. Therefore, in addition to the non-specific symptoms, COVID-19 might be underdiagnosed 
because of false-negative results or co-infection with other respiratory viruses. [78]
Low sensitivity of upper respiratory specimens for detection of SARS-CoV-2
Diagnosis of COVID-19 is made mainly on the basis of nucleic acid detection from nasopharyngeal swabs. A previous 
report indicated 2 challenges in the diagnosis of COVID-19. First, the sensitivity of tests to detect SARS-CoV-2 from 
upper respiratory specimens might be insufficient and two, repeated rRT-PCR testing of nasopharyngeal swabs were 
usually negative for SARS-CoV-2. In that report, SARS-CoV-2 was finally identified by using metagenomic next-gener-
ation sequencing (mNGS) and rRT-PCR of a bronchoalveolar lavage fluid (BALF) sample. This was achieved with the 
persistence of the Clinician because of the patient’s travel history. Therefore, suitable sputum or BALF specimens are 
necessary to maximize detection in cases of high clinical suspicion for identifying SARS-CoV-2 because the highest vi-
ral loads were found in sputum with moderate loads in nose-throat swabs. [73] Testing of specimens from multiple sites 
may improve the sensitivity and reduce false-negative test results.
Disproportionate or damaging evolution of effective defenses against the virus  (‘‘Cytokine storm’’)
The balance and timing of early immune responses to infection play a critical role in determining the outcome of in-
fections. In some cases, a reaction takes place which as a whole is labeled a ‘cytokine storm’ that results in extensive 
tissue damage. The protagonist of this storm is interleukin 6 (IL-6), produced by activated leukocytes and acts on a 
large number of cells and tissues. The major role of IL-6 is pro-inflammatory, it increases during inflammatory dis-
eases, infections, autoimmune disorders, cardiovascular diseases, and some types of cancer. It is also implicated in the 
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pathogenesis of the cytokine release syndrome (CRS) that is an acute systemic inflammatory syndrome characterized 
by fever and multiple organ dysfunction. Pathological investigation on a COVID-19 patient using peripheral blood flow 
cytometric analysis shows hyperactivated CD4 and CD8 T cells with increased concentration of highly proinflammato-
ry CCR6+ Th17 in CD4 T cells, while the CD8 T cells were found to harbour high concentrations of cytotoxic granules 
and were perforin/granulysin positive. [79] These imply that overactivation of T cells, manifested by increase of Th17 
and high cytotoxicity of CD8 T cells, accounts for, in part, the severe immune injury in the patients. [79] In the case of 
septic shock in COVID-19, fatal infection of humans appears to be associated with an elevation or overproduction of 
anti-SARS-Cov-2 pro inflammatory cytokines, TNF-α, and alveolar macrophages, among others. If SARS-CoV-2 elicits 
damaging host responses particularly in the elderly, then therapeutic interventions that modify those responses may 
help the immune system to control viral replication and achieve survival.
Potential silent transmission via the fecal-oral route
Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 by respiratory and extrarespiratory routes may be responsible for the rapid spread of 
COVID-19 disease. Prior to respiratory symptoms, many patients reported diarrhea, nausea, vomiting and abdominal 
discomfort. Immunofluorescent studies show ACE2 receptors in glandular cells of gastric, duodenal, and rectal epithe-
lia. ACE2 had been reported to be co-localized with TMPRSS2 in absorptive enterocytes and upper epithelial cells of 
esophagus. The first USA confirmed case had a 2 day history of nausea, vomiting and dry cough while SARS-CoV-2 se-
quences were detected from the stool. [72] Similarly, in a previous study, out of 73 patients, 39 tested positive in the stool 
(10-78 years of age) for 1-12 days while 17 patients remained positive in the stool even after negative respiratory samples. 
The live virus was detected in feces, implying that SARS-CoV-2 may be transmitted by the  fecal-oral route and possibly 
urine. [42] Therefore, generation and inhalation of bio-aerosols during flatulence or flushing of the commodes should 
be avoided and it may be shown that individuals should not use the toilet immediately after use by another person.
Collection, consumption, and trade of wild game
The index cases of several viral diseases outbreaks have been more or less directly associated with hunting, trading, 
or consumption of bush meat such as monkeys, antelopes, and bats. [80] The SARS, which has shown its potential 
in China as a respiratory and gastrointestinal disease, was because of the illegal trade of wildlife, where an infected 
masked palm civet (Paguma larvata) was the culprit for the spread of SARS. [81] The index case of the initial Coronavi-
rus disease 2019 (COVID-19) were epidemiologically linked to exposure to Wuhan’s Huanan seafood market in China, 
where wild animals are traded and SARS-CoV-2 infections have been detected in dogs, cats, ferrets, and tiger. [82] As 
activities like hunting wild animals and consumption of game meat/ bush meat result in the spread of zoonotic diseases 
to humans, about 13,000 pounds of bushmeat were estimated to be imported into the UK annually. Therefore, the trade 
and consumption of ‘bushmeat’ should be highly regulated as these could serve as sources of outbreak in the respective 
destinations. 
Lack of emergency preparedness, infection control practices and paucity of health infrastructures
Owing to misplacements of priorities, the dearth of funding, lack of test kits, medical equipment, and accessories (e.g. 
ventilator), COVID-19 patients were often cared for without the use of personal protective equipment (face masks, 
gowns, gloves, goggles, disposable suits, boots, etc). These risks expose health care providers to infections and hastens 
the spread and death in severe cases. Developing economies, especially African, should establish effective and func-
tional public health facilities with the appropriate advanced infrastructure and virologists to cope with emergency 
situations and emergency preparedness. Disease surveillance, intelligence and monitoring in human and animal pop-
ulations should be mandatory. Social mobilization and awareness campaigns should also be strengthened to dispel 
dangerous rumors that encourage spread of dangerous infectious diseases.
Overcrowded institutions, military establishment, warships, camps, and correctional facilities are potentially vulnerable. 
As a respiratory virus, the person-to-person transmission in crowded, overcrowded, and confined environments can 
be exponential. Educational institutions, correctional facilities (Prisons) and military camps are formidable environ-
ments for COVID-19 ravage. COVID-19 infection was first detected on a Naval vessel at sea on March 24, 2020 aboard 
the US Nuclear Naval ship Aircraft carrier (Theodore Roosevelt) with reported outbreak among the crew of more than 
4,000 on March 31, 2020 at Guam. [83] The outbreak was a dangerous phenomena altogether considering the inherent 
limitation of space in warships, usually full of weapons, with billion of dollars of equipment, where those positive cases 
jumped exponentially, where fire hazards and nuclear reactors are present, where quarantine and social distancing 
is also impossible. Tight quarters in warships make the virus conducive to spread among large numbers of sailors in 
a confined space sharing sleeping quarters, restrooms, workspaces, and mess hall, with potential susceptibility to re-
infection even after recovery. To avert unwarranted spread of COVID-19 in prison facilities of Nigeria, Indonesia and 
several other countries, some inmates were set free by the Government.
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Threats to the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2
Threats are external elements in the environment that could cause trouble for SARS-CoV-2. That is, external factors, 
which make the virus vulnerable, beyond the pathogen’s control, which could place the virus’ mission or operations at 
risk. Essentially, the external conditions that are inimical to SARS-CoV-2’s  establishment, and which may be harnessed 
for elimination of the virus as presented in Table 1, include the following:
Prohibition of mass gatherings, prompt hospitalization, isolation, and quarantine
Quarantine is regarded as enforced isolation of areas or individuals who may be infected. It may involve closure of 
schools, markets, worship congregations, relaxation centres, conferences and sports competitions, as well as total shut-
down of the system or lockdown of countries. In addition, social/physical distancing, use of face masks, respiratory 
etiquete  and hand hygiene are milestones in reducing transmission of the virus. In the implementation of these threats, 
the ethical and social aspects should not be overlooked. Required isolation of patients to avoid transmission should not 
be seen as segregation and palliative measures must be put in place to avoid revolts. 
Prohibition of all wildlife trade to effectively prevent viral prevalence
The pathogens of SARS-Coronavirus and SARS-CoV-2 are both derived from wild animals. Therefore, hunting, selling, 
and eating wild animals not only seriously damage the ecosystem, but also lead to the spread of epidemic diseases.
Repurposing proven Antimalarial/Antiviral/ anti-inflammatory drugs
Small-molecule agents for treating other human diseases may modulate the virus–host interactions of SARS-CoV-2. A 
number of proven drugs against some diseases are being tested with the aim of using such to treat COVID-19. Some of 
these drugs include remdesivir first developed for Ebola virus treatment (is now approved by the FDA for COVID-19); 
interferon alfa-2b currently used for Hepatitis C with efficacy in animal models against MERS-CoV; combination of 
lopinavir and ritonavir (Kaletra) for HIV-AIDS; favipiravir for Influenza; sarilumab; chloroquine and azithromycin are 
now being tested. [84] Chloroquine, an approved immune modulator has been shown to demonstrate inhibitory effects 
against SARS-CoV-2 (EC50 = 1.13 μM in Vero E6 cells) and evaluation in an open-label clinical trials with COVID-19 pa-
tients was promising, although an observational study did not show a benefit. [85-87] With EC50 of 1.13 μmol/L and se-
lectivity index (SI) greater than 88, chloroquine can effectively inhibit pH dependent endocytosis of SARS-CoV-2 in the 
cell level as chloroquine phosphate turns into chloroquine in the body and target the virus’ Nsp3b or E-channel to play 
therapeutic effect. [86] Darunavir is an HIV-1 protease inhibitor that selectively inhibits the cleavage of HIV-encoded 
Gag-Pol polyprotein in virally infected cells, thereby preventing the formation of mature infectious virus particles. At 
a concentration of 300 μmol/L, darunavir can significantly inhibit virus replication while the docking results showed 
that the possible targets were Nsp3c, PLpro, E-channel or spike proteins. [88] Umefenovir (Arbidol hydrochloride) is a 
broad-spectrum anti-viral drug, mainly for the treatment of influenza A and B viruses, but effective against SARS-CoV 
and MERS-CoV. Arbidol blocks virus replication by inhibiting the fusion of the lipid membrane of the virus with the 
host cells and effectively inhibited Coronavirus up to 60 times at a concentration of 10–30 μmol/L, thereby preventing 
the virus’s pathological effects on cells while the docking results with the possible drug targets of the SARS-CoV-2 
showed interaction with Nsp7_Nsp8 complex, Nsp14, Nsp15, E-channel, or the spike. [88] Considering the challenges 
with vaccine development, it is pertinent to consider further research into exploiting a shift from the current paradigm 
of ‘profitable Pharma model’ in medicine to a worldwide integrative /alternative / holistic medical practitioners ‘‘in 
the field” for their experiences in treating otherwise difficult to treat infections, and a fair review for consideration of 
traditional, complementary and alternative drugs.
Deployment of rapid laboratory equipment and procedures for prompt detection (ELISA, Western Blot, PCR)
A number of diagnostics and techniques are currently available for laboratory diagnosis of COVID-19. Acute infection is 
diagnosed by RT-PCR tests to detect viral antigens. These tests can be positive from day 3 to 14 days of infection. These 
technologies and personnel should be made available for use. Development and deployment of Rapid point of care di-
agnostics (such as Immunochromatographic EIA kits)  will help in overcoming challenges of weak surveillance. This 
will also facilitate testing, and retesting for decisions on isolation, quarantine, treatment, and discharge as appropriate.
Active contact tracing and monitoring
Contact tracing involves finding everyone who had contact with infected individuals and watching / monitoring for 
signs of illness for 21 days, usually 14 days. Contacts include close, casual, and distant. If any of the contacts comes down 
with the ailment, they should be isolated, tested, and treated. The process is then repeated by tracing the contacts’ con-
tacts. [89] In respect of Ship, buses or air travels, as direct contact is the main route of transmission for COVID-19, only 
the passengers who were seated in direct proximity to the index passenger should be included in the trace-back, i.e. 
only passengers who were one seat away from the index case (+/- 1 seat in all directions) should be traced back. If the
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index case occupied an aisle seat, the three passengers seated directly across the aisle from the index case should also 
be traced back, as in cases of other virulent viruses. [90]
Appropriate burial practices according to international best practices
To avoid excessive manipulation of the body, embalming is not recommended. People who have died from COVID-19 
can be buried or cremated only as a matter of cultural choice, available resources, and national and local requirements 
that may dictate the handling and disposition of the remains. [91] Health care workers, mortuary staff or families, and 
traditional burial attendants (e.g. family member or religious leader) preparing the deceased (e.g. washing, cleaning or 
dressing body, tidying hair, trimming nails or shaving) should wear appropriate PPE according to standard precautions 
(gloves, impermeable disposable gown [or disposable gown with impermeable apron], medical mask, eye protection in-
cluding the use of face shield or goggles) for any activity that may involve splashing or leakage of bodily fluids. [91] Any-
one who has assisted in preparing the body should thoroughly wash their hands with soap and water when finished. 
Family and friends should reduce their exposure as much as possible and may view the body after it has been prepared 
for burial, in accordance with customs at a minimum distance of 1 m. They should not touch or kiss the body and should 
wash hands thoroughly with soap and water after the viewing. Children, older people (>60 years old), and anyone with 
underlying illnesses (such as respiratory illness, heart disease, diabetes, or compromised immune systems) should not 
directly interact with the body. Burials should take place in a timely manner with limited number of participants, in 
accordance with local practices. Participants should observe physical distancing at all times, plus respiratory etiquette, 
and hand hygiene. Those tasked with placing the body in the grave, or the funeral pyre, should wear gloves and wash 
hands with soap and water after removal of the gloves once the burial is complete. Funeral ceremonies should be post-
poned, as much as possible, until the end of the epidemic. The belongings of the deceased person should be handled 
with gloves and cleaned with a detergent followed by disinfection with a solution of at least 70% ethanol or 0.1% (1000 
ppm) hypochlorite. [91]  
Sterilization or disinfection of equipment and safe disposal of waste
Like other Coronaviruses, SARS-CoV-2 is sensitive to ultraviolet rays and heat. It can be effectively inactivated by lip-
id solvents including ether, ethanol, chlorine-containing disinfectant, peroxyacetic acid and chloroform. Appropriate 
concentration of calcium or sodium hypochlorite (a lipid solvent, an inactivating agent which distrupts the viral enve-
lope, the ligands, and in effect subsequent attachment and infectivity) is effective to decontaminate the premises and 
disinfect equipment and other materials exposed to biological contamination with SARS-CoV-2. Patient’ excretions 
should be disposed of properly, and hands washed frequently using soap and water for 20 seconds, as well as hand san-
itizers containing at least 60% ethanol or 70% isopropanol. [92] Used articles, beddings and linens should be machine 
washed with laundry detergent and warm water at 60−90°C (140−194°F), dry and disinfected. [91] 
Potential antiviral activities of Coagulation Factor Xa, IIa (thrombin) and convalescent plasma
Coagulation Factor Xa and IIa (thrombin)were shown to cleave and activate the Spike S protein of Coronavirus into S1 
and S2 domains, thereby facilitating cellular infectivity. [93] This finding was employed recently by Ai et al. who identi-
fied “Dabigatran” as a possible therapeutic for COVID-19. [40] Similarly, the possible benefit of dipyridamole (anticoag-
ulant) for COVID-19 was also reported. [94] Convalescent plasma or immunoglobulins have been used as a last resort to 
improve the survival rate of patients with SARS, and recovered from Ebola virus disease was recommended by WHO as 
an empirical treatment during Ebola outbreaks while a protocol for the use of convalescent plasma in the treatment of 
MERS was established in 2015. [74] Following these previous successes, these treatment strategies can also be adapted 
in the current fight against COVID-19.
Availability of the genome sequences of SARS-CoV-2
The genome composition and divergence of the novel coronavirus was determined by sequencing in mid January in 
China as well as in Australia, Philipines and USA, while cryo-EM technique has revealed  the atomic structure of the 
spike protein of SARS-COV-2. [95,96] As of  March 2020, 183 genome sequences  of the SARS-COV-2 isolates around 
the world have been provided in the GenBank. These rapid achievements provide information that will specifically 
help in development of appropriate diagnostic tests, therapeutics, and vaccine design against the virus. [97]
Global COVID-19 research funding
The outbreak has prompted WHO and some other major global and national health organizations to announce the 
research on COVID-19 as a priority with dedicating huge funds for the related investigations. A meeting for the assess-
ment of current knowledge on this viral disease and determining the research directions was held by WHO in collabo-
ration with GloPID-R (the Global Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease Preparedness) with the participation 
of scientists from various disciplines and funders from different parts of the world. [98] Individual countries are taking 
the initiatives in providing fundings for research as well as mitigating the  impacts of lockdown and shutdown while 
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philantropists around the world are donating money, equipment, reagents, test kits, personal protective equipment, 
and so on, to overcome this ‘‘millenium enemy against humanity’’.
Conclusion
As in any battle, knowing the enemy is a major step for defeating it. There are still many unknowns about the emergent 
SARS-CoV-2. Great efforts are being taken to elucidate the virus behavior, transmission, biological strenghts, oppor-
tunities for infection and other aspects. As a paradigm shift, the SWOT concept can be adopted to help us as scientists 
to formulate and apply strategies that augment our research and enable us to understand and combat emerging and/or 
recalcitrant infectious diseases. This research contributes answers to some of the questions that borders on exposing 
the ‘‘Achilles heel’’ of the virus for interventions in eradication of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The identified capacities and gaps presented in this study are an inexhaustive framework to combat the SARS-CoV-2 
virus and COVID-19. Mankind is dealing with a major threat to human life on earth, and a transboundary human and 
animal disease that could easily be turned into a bioweapon. Committed research communities can and will tap from 
these findings, in addition to established foundational knowledge, to guide appropriate responses to the COVID-19 
challenges.
It is pertinent to state that SARS-CoV-2 explores its biological strengths, conserves its weaknesses, and exploits host 
opportunities to decimate human population to the extent that within 5 months, over 310,082 lives have been lost to 
this virus around the world. To undermine and overcome the virus, research focus should be aimed at strategically 
crushing the strengths and opportunities that are helpful to SARS-CoV-2 in achieving the pathogenic objective, while 
increasing further the weaknesses of, and threats to the virus that are harmful to achieving the pathogenic objective. 
Research scientists, the academia and the industry should scale up all promising research findings by holistically har-
monising all the identified factors, putting them into perspective and build more on threats to the virus.  
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